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THE DUE-ON-SALE CONTROVERSY:
BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF THE GARN-
ST. GERMAIN DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTION ACT OF 1982
The recent federal preemption of state restrictions on the
enforceability of due-on-sale clauses, accomplished by section 341 of
the Gan-St. Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982 (the Garn
Act),' came amid considerable controversy. In recent years, the due-
on-sale clause, a contract provision permitting a lender to declare a
mortgage loan immediately due and payable if the real property
securing the loan is transferred without the lender's consent, 2 has been
criticized by legal commentators and invalidated by both courts and
legislatures.3
The Gan Act essentially authorizes blanket use and routine
enforcement of due-on-sale clauses.4 It preempts state invalidations of
1. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1505 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a) to -3(g) (1982)).
2. In some contexts, the term due-on-sale has been used loosely to refer to a provision that
triggers acceleration upon any transaction affecting the title of the securing property, such as the
imposition of a subordinate lien. Throughout this note, the term due-on-sale wil refer only to
provisions concerning the actual transfer of the securing property. The use of due-on-
encumbrance provisions has declined considerably in recent years, Thornburg, The Due-on-Sale
Clause: Current Legislative Actions and Probable Trends, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 645, 646 (1981),
and their enforceability is no longer a particularly important issue. For an example of the judicial
treatment afforded such due-on-encumbrance clauses, see La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 869, 489 P.2d 1113, 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851 (1971)(clause held to be
invalid as an unreasonable restraint on alienation unless exercised solely to protect the lender's
security).
3. See infra notes 36, 46, 86, 87 and accompanying text.
4. The Gain Act's authorization applies equally to all lenders and to virtually all types of
loan instruments secured by real property. See 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)(2) to (3) (1982). The Act
does place some restrictions on the use of the due-on-sale clause. The clause may not be
exercised, regardless of when or by whom the loan may have been originated, in any of the
following situations:
(I) the creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the lender's security inter-
est which does not relate to a transfer of rights of occupancy in the property;
(2) the creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances;
(3) a transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a joint tenant or
tenant by the entirety;
(4) the granting of a leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option to
purchase;
(5) a transfer to a relative resulting from the death of a borrower,
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the clause and frees lenders from almost all restrictions on the use of
due-on-sale clauses except in the narrow class of mortgages originated
or assumed after the relevant state invalidated the clause and
outstanding when Congress passed the Act. To protect the expectations
of borrowers who in good faith believed that the due-on-sale clauses in
such mortgage contracts were unenforceable, the Act provides that its
preemptive provisions need not apply for the full term of loans made
during a specified "window period." The window period began on the
date on which the state invalidated due-on-sale clauses and ended
October 15, 1982, the effective date of the Garn Act.5 Under the
provisions of the Gain Act, this moratorium on enforcement of the
due-on-sale clauses of window period loans lasts only three years, until
October 15, 1985.6 State legislatures, however, retain the power during
that three year period to extend the moratorium for the full term of
window period loans, and the appropriate federal agencies retain the
same power with regard to federal lending institutions.7
Although legislatures in states that prior to the enactment of the
Garn Act restricted the use of due-on-sale clauses may reinstitute those
prohibitions with regard to window period loans, this note advises
against any extension of the Act's three year moratorium. Permitting
lenders to enforce due-on-sale clauses is the more reasonable position
to adopt, from both legal and economic perspectives. By extending the
length of the Garn Act's window period exception, a state would only
perpetuate the distortions that the due-on-sale restrictions created.8
Part I of this note examines the development of the controversy
(6) a transfer where the spouse or children of the borrower become an owner of the
property;
(7) a transfer resulting from a decree of a dissolution of marriage, legal separation agree-
ment, or from an incidental property settlement agreement, by which the spouse of the
borrower becomes an owner of the property;
(8) a transfer into an inter vivos trust in which the borrower is and remains a beneficiary
and which does not relate to a trustee of rights of occupancy in the property; or
(9) any other transfer or disposition described in regulations prescribed by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board.
12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d) (1982). Congress included this section to prevent unconscionable or ineq-
uitable exercise of the due-on-sale clause. S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3054, 3078-79 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982).
6. Id
7. Id. The Senate Report on the Garn Act indicates clearly that a state that had already
imposed restrictions on the use of due-on-sale clauses could "lengthen the time that State due-on-
sale restrictions would apply to window period loans." SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3077.
Clearly, then, such a state could extend that time long enough to reimpose its restrictions for the
full term of window period loans. A state may not extend the scope of its restrictions, however.
Id A state is also free to shorten the length of the moratorium, or to reduce the scope of its
restrictions. Id.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 32-33.
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surrounding the use of due-on-sale clauses. 9 Part II assesses the
arguments for and against enforcing such clauses,10 and concludes that
decisions denying enforcement represent an emotional rather than
reasoned response to a perceived "burden" on borrowers." Courts
refusing to enforce the clauses seem to oppose any "contract which
provides a benefit to an institutional, deep pocket party, on the basis
that all benefits should somehow flow to the consumer."'12 Yet,
enforcing due-on-sale clauses benefits not only lenders, but also the
greatest number of borrowers and potential borrowers. 13 Part III
reviews the post-Garn Act status of the due-on-sale clause, and
discusses its likely future. 14
I. THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE BEFORE THE GARN ACT
Historically, lenders employed due-on-sale provisions in loan
agreements to protect their security interests.' 5 Although lenders nor-
mally satisfy themselves with the creditworthiness of the original bor-
rower, they have no assurance that an assignee of the mortgage would
be equally creditworthy if the mortgage were freely assumable. To pro-
tect themselves from "specific risk," that is, the risk of loss associated
with defaults by mortgage assumers who do not satisfy the lenders'
credit requirements, lenders began including an acceleration provision
in their mortgage contracts that allowed the lender to declare the mort-
gage due and payable in full upon a transfer by the mortgagor of the
securing property. The due-on-sale clause is usually drafted in general
terms with no mention of its specific purpose. 16 As a result, lenders
began to condition their consent to a particular transfer of the securing
9. See infra text accompanying notes 15-30.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 31-74.
11. One critic of the due-on-sale clause went so far as to characterize it as a "sword of
Damocles" hanging over the head of a borrower contemplating a transfer of the securing property.
Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in California in Times of
Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F.L. Rav. 267, 285 (1972).
12. Subcomm. on "Due-on" Clauses of the Comm. on Real Estate Financing, Enforcement of
Due-on-Transfer Clauses-A Review and Commentary of the State of the Law on Enforceability of
Acceleration Provisions in Mortgages and Deeds of Trust by Reason of Transfer of an Interest in
Security, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 891, 935 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Subcoma. Report].
13. See infra notes 52-53, 62-63 and accompanying text.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 75-93.
IS. Bonanno, supra note 11, at 271.
16. The clause used by the lender in Northwestern Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ternes, 315
N.W.2d 296, 298 (N.D. 1982) is typical:
If any sale or *conveyance of said property is made by the mortgagor, his executors,
administrators, successors or assigns, without the written consent of the mortgagee, its
successors or assigns, and without an agreement in the instrument of conveyance under
which the grantee assumes and agrees to pay the indebtedness, then in either event the
mortgagee may at its option and without notice declare the entire amount of the mort-
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property on the purchaser's agreeing to an increase in the interest rate
on the loan. If the purchaser did not agree to pay a higher rate of
interest, the lender simply called the loan due and used the funds to
make new loans at prevailing, and presumably higher, interest rates.
Thus, the due-on-sale clause allowed lenders to protect themselves
from "portfolio risk," that is, the risk of loss resulting from holding
long term assets with fixed rates of return while financing the portfolio
with short term liabilities during periods of rising interest rates.17
For the past several decades, rising interest rates increasingly
prompted lenders to enforce due-on-sale provisions even when the pro-
posed assumption of the mortgage posed no threat to the lender's secur-
ity interest.' 8 This practice led to strident protests from borrowers and
legal commentators, and ultimately to varying degrees of judicial and
legislative response.' 9 Some courts and legislatures forbade enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clauses, either as an unreasonable restraint on
alienation of property or as an inequitable or unconscionable contract
provision;20 other courts and legislatures upheld enforcement of these
clauses.2' A few states merely restricted the amount by which a lender
could increase the interest rate, upon assumption, under threat of
acceleration. 22
The federal government first entered the fray in 1976, when the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) issued a regulation author-
izing the use of due-on-sale clauses by federally chartered savings and
loan associations.23 This authorization created competitive disparities
between state and federally chartered lenders. In a state that otherwise
gage indebtedness immediately due and payable and may foreclose the mortgage as pre-
scribed by law.
17. See Comment, Due-on-Sale Clauses: The Economic andLegalIssues, 43 U. PiTT. L. REV.
441, 443 (1982); see also infra note 70 and accompanying text.
18. See Bonanno, supra note 11, at 278.
19. Id at 278-79.
20. Some courts have refused to enforce the clause absent a showing that the lender's security
interest would be jeopardized by the transfer. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d
943, 948, 587 P.2d 970, 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385-86 (1978); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 166, 250 N.W.2d 804, 806 (1977); Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61,
64 (Miss. 1975). For a complete list of state restrictions on the enforceability of due-on-sale
clauses, see infra notes 86-87.
21. These courts have found nothing wrong with the unconditional enforcement of the due-
on-sale clause as written. See, e.g., Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294,
301, 509 P.2d 1240, 1242 (1983); In re Foreclosure of Deed of Trust Executed by Bonder, 306 N.C.
451,459, 293 S.E.2d 798, 803 (1982); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 812
(Tex. 1982).
22. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-60-165 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-15-5(b) (1982); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 47.20 (Supp. 1984); see also infra note 87.
23. This regulation is now codified at Contract Provisions for Real Estate Loans, 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.8-3(f) (1983).
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would not enforce a due-on-sale clause, a federally chartered lender
enjoyed a competitive advantage over state institutions, because it
could update the return on its loan portfolio more rapidly.24 When the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Fidelity Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. de la Cuesta,25 declaring that the FHLBB's regula-
tion preempted state laws to the contrary with respect to federally
chartered lenders, it confirmed the disparity between federal and state
institutions.
These problems were not of trivial dimensions. With a few nota-
ble exceptions, 26 all mortgage contracts now contain a due-on-sale
clause,27 and lenders enforce them as a matter of course, where they
can do so legally, in order to adjust the interest rates on their loans.
Volatile interest rates in recent years28 provoked many confrontations
between lenders and borrowers over the enforceability of due-on-sale
24. See Finch, Due-on-Sale Clauses in Debt Instruments: Reconciling Legal Doctrine and Mar-
ket Realities, 98 BANKING LJ. 300, 329-30 (1981); Note, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: .4
Victoryfor the Consumer?, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 304 (1979); Comment, supra note 17, at 451.
This advantage can be illustrated with a simplified example. Two lenders, one federally chartered
and one state chartered, each make loans at 10% in year one. In year two market rates rise to 15%,
and half of those loans are assumed in connection with a sale of the securing property. The
federal lender, pursuant to the due-on-sale clause, can raise the rates on those loans to 15%, but
the state lender is forced to accept the assumption at the earlier contract rate, 10%. As a result, the
return on the federal lender's portfolio is 12.5% whereas the return on the state lender's portfolio
remains at 10%. Because it is making more on its existing loans, the federal lender can charge less
for its new loans than the state lender, thereby drawing business away from the state lender.
25. 458 U.S. 141 (1982). The principal issue in the case was whether regulations issued by an
agency such as the FHLBB could have a preemptive effect on state law. The Court accepted the
wisdom of the FHLBB's authorization to enforce due-on-sale clauses without much scrutiny. Id
at 168. For a more detailed discussion of this decision with respect to the preemption of state law
by FHLBB regulations, see Comment, Section 341 of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of1982: .An End to the Due-on-Sale Controversy?, 14 U. TO. L. REV. 1427, 1437-42 (1983).
26. Due-on-sale clauses are prohibited in mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Admin-
istration or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration. In 1980, such mortgages represented
about 20% of all new mortgage loans secured by single-family homes. OFFICE OF POLICY DEVEL-
OPMENT AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AN Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES 19 (1981) [hereinafter cited as HUD REPORT].
27. Id
28. Although many factors have contributed to recent interest rate volatility, the most signifi-
cant is the change instituted in the operating procedure of the Federal Reserve Open Market
Committee (FOMC). In October of 1979, the FOMC restructured its open market operations, the
buying and selling of Treasury securities, to achieve desired targets for monetary aggregates, re-
gardless of the resulting movements in interest rates, instead of desired federal funds rate targets.
See Lang, The FOMC in 1979: Introducing Reserve Targeting, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
REV., March 1980, at 2, 4, 9. Thereafter, market rates fluctuated in a dramatic fashion; the prime
rate moved from about 20% down to 11% and back to 20% in the ensuing 18 months. Motley &
Runyan, Interest Rates and the Fed, FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRAN. WEEKLY LETrER, Feb.
20, 1981, at 2. Although rates have settled somewhat since then, they will nonetheless continue to
be more volatile than in the past as a result of the FOMC's policy of achieving money growth
targets.
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clauses.29 It was in this context of unequal treatment of lenders with
regard to the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses that Congress en-
acted section 341 of the Gan Act. In opting for general enforceability,
Congress was attempting both to remove the advantages enjoyed by
some lenders and to resolve the longstanding debate between borrow-
ers and lenders in a matter most beneficial to the long term health of
the mortgage industry and to the greatest number of borrowers.30
II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE: AN ASSESSMENT
When states invalidated due-on-sale clauses prior to the Garn Act,
despite the FHLBB's preemption of those restrictions for federal lend-
ers, they not only placed lenders chartered by that state at a competitive
disadvantage, 31 but also created macroeconomic distortions in the na-
tional flow of funds within and to the mortgage market. The absence
of a due-on-sale clause makes a mortgage relatively less attractive on
the secondary market. In particular, the Government National Mort-
gage Association, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, which to-
gether represent ten percent of the secondary market, require due-on-
sale clauses in the mortgages that they purchase.32 Lenders in states
restricting the use of the clause are forced to sell their loans at a dis-
count, which puts them at a disadvantage in bidding for those funds
available to the mortgage market as a whole, and may ultimately direct
mortgage funds away from those states that would not enforce the
clause. Congress could have addressed this problem by invalidating
due-on-sale clauses across the board, as this would have eliminated any
preference that might be enjoyed by due-on-sale states in the secondary
market. But by doing so, Congress would also have rendered mortgage
29. Past periods of interest rate increases have been followed by relative calm, notably in the
early 1960's and 1970's, and the due-on-sale controversy has waxed and waned with interest rates.
See Bonanno, supra note 11, at 279-80. This perhaps explains why only a small number of state
legislatures have taken any action to restrict the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses, given the
inevitable lag between the time a particular issue is brought to the legislature's attention and the
time that legislation is actually passed. If interest rates level or decline during that lag period, so
that lenders are no longer exercising their rights under due-on-sale clauses, the legislature may
consider the issue moot and turn its attention to more pressing issues. Indeed, it is surely no
coincidence that Congress did not act until interest rate volatility was recognized as a continuing
phenomenon.
30. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3075.
31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
32. Thornburg, supra note 2, at 650; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3075. Of
course, the clause cannot be required in those jurisdictions that prohibit it. In lieu of the due-on-
sale clause, Fannie Mae requires the loan to contain a seven year call option. HUD REPORT,
supra note 26, at 29.
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loans less attractive as a class of investment, and would likely have
driven some funds out of the mortgage market altogether, again creat-
ing macroeconomic distortions.33
To the extent that states choose to extend the moratorium on pre-
emption for window period loans, these distortions, unlike the
microeconomic distortions discussed below,34 threaten to persist. Lend-
ers in a state such as Arizona, where the window period is eleven
years,35 have a significant percentage of loans with unenforceable due-
on-sale clauses in their portfolios. As long as the due-on-sale provi-
sions in such loans remain unenforceable, the loans will continue to be
unattractive on the secondary market and mortgage funds will be di-
rected to federally chartered lenders or to lenders in nonrestricting
states. If the moratorium were extended indefinitely on window period
loans, it would take twenty to thirty years for this distortion to dissipate
completely.
Nonetheless, most of the controversy surrounding the enforceabil-
ity of due-on-sale clauses focuses on microeconomic relationships be-
tween particular borrowers and lenders. Those who support the
invalidation of due-on-sale clauses argue either that such clauses
should be void as unreasonable restraints on alienation of property or
that they should be unenforceable as inequitable or unconscionable.
Neither of these arguments withstands scrutiny, however. The costs of
invalidating the clause exceed the benefits.
A. The Due-on-Sale Clause and the Unconscionability Doctrine.
Unconscionability arguments rely on characterizing the borrower
as an economic underdog: "These clauses afford the potential not only
for great profits but also for frequent abuses. They place borrowers at
the mercy of the savings institutions."36 But where is the abuse? One
court suggested that a lender attempting to impose a greater-than-mar-
ket rate upon assumption would be flirting with unconscionability; 37
yet the court neglected to observe that the lender would be unsuccessful
33. The New Mexico legislature cited this problem as justification for its decision to permit a
limited interest rate increase upon assumption for its window period loans. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 48-7-15 to -19; see also infra note 89 and accompanying text.
34. See infra text accompanying note 73.
35. The Arizona Supreme Court has determined that the window period began there on July
8, 1971. Scappaticci v. Southwest Ass'n, 135 Ariz. 456, 461, 662 P.2d 131, 136 (1983); see also infra
note 86.
36. Note, Judicial Treatment ofthe Due-on-Sale Clause: The Case for Adopting Standards of
Reasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 1109, 1124 (1975).
37. Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 304, 509 P.2d 1240, 1245
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because the prospective purchaser could always obtain financing else-
where, presumably at market rates. Similarly, fears that lenders will
impose usurious rates on the party assuming the mortgage are un-
founded because federal law has lifted most state interest rate limita-
tions from first-mortgage loans.3 8 Unfortunately, discussion of the
subject of interest rates often becomes distorted by emotion;39 personal
sympathies for respective plights of borrowers and lenders aside, how-
ever, there appears to be no basis in usury law for finding a due-on-sale
clause to be an unconscionable contract provision.40
The due-on-sale clause has also been said to be unconscionable
because it amounts to a "sleeper" clause; the borrower may be unaware
at the time the contract is made that the lender will condition his con-
sent to a mortgage assumption not simply on the creditworthiness of
the prospective purchaser, but also on his willingness to agree to an
increased rate of interest.41 There may be some merit to this contention
given a generally worded due-on-sale provision;42 a borrower could
well be surprised to learn of the lender's motive in enforcing the clause.
But what should his expectations be?43 The language of the typical
38. Section 501 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132, 161-63 (codified as a note to 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1982)),
provides that state laws "limiting the rate or amount of interest, discount points, [or finance]
charges" shall not apply to any loan, mortgage, credit sale, or advance that is "secured by a first
lien on residential real property." Although a number of states have acted to override that federal
preemption, most of them do not impose any interest rate ceiling in first-mortgage loans as a
matter of state law. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 138.052(11) (1983).
39. The Tennessee Supreme Court, in holding that the use of a due-on-sale clause to increase
the interest rate on the loan was not unconscionable, noted the unfortunate tendency of some to
"savor the subject of interest with a grimace." Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tenn.
1973).
40. See 1d; Malouffv. Midland Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 304, 509 P.2d 1240, 1245
(1983); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex. 1982).
41. See Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 167, 250 N.W.2d
804, 808 (1977); Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471, 481
(Minn. 1981); see also Thornburg, supra note 2, at 653-54; Note, supra note 36, at 1124.
42. See, e.g., supra note 16.
43. The Minnesota Supreme Court argued that because the historical purpose of the due-on-
sale clause was to protect the lender from specific risk, the borrower could reasonably assume that
he was bargaining for enforcement of the clause only if assumption represented a credit risk.
Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471, 481 (Minn. 1981). A
borrower sophisticated enough to appreciate the historical rationale for the due-on-sale clause,
however, would seem to be just as likely to appreciate the modem portfolio risk rationale, and,
according to this argument, would therefore have bargained with that in mind as well. Most likely,
the average borrower has no idea at the time he enters into the loan contract why the due-on-sale
clause is valued by the lender, although it might become painfully obvious when he tries to assign
the mortgage. On the other hand, a borrower obtaining legal advice in connection with the trans-
action, as is often the case, could reasonably be expected to be informed of the effect of the due-
on-sale clause. In either case, the borrower has no reason to assume that the clause will be en-
forced only to protect the lender from specific risk.
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clause describes the borrower's rights and duties unambiguously; he
may repay the loan on a periodic basis only as long as he owns the
securing property. Understanding the lender's motives does not alter
the borrower's obligations under the contract.
The inadequate disclosure argument in recent years has, however,
been losing whatever merit it may have had. First, the clauses increas-
ingly include language that explicitly sets forth the lender's intention to
exercise the clause in order to protect itself from portfolio risk. 4 In
addition, the escalation of the controversy to the federal level has in-
creased general awareness of the existence of the due-on-sale clause
and of the purposes that the clause serves.
B. The Due-on-Sale Clause as a Restraint on Alienation.
The case against enforcement of due-on-sale clauses as unreasona-
ble restraints on alienation stumbles at the first step. The Restatement
of Property describes a restraint on alienation as
an attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or contract to cause
a later conveyance:
(a) to be void; or
(b) to impose contractual liability on the one who makes the later
conveyance when such liability results from a breach of an agree-
ment not to convey; or
(c) to terminate or subject to termination all or part of the property
interest conveyed.45
A due-on-sale clause fits this definition, if at all, only under subsection
(b), referred to by the Restatement as "promissory restraint. ' 46 But the
due-on-sale clause is a poor fit even as a promissory restraint. No
"contractual liability" actually results from the borrower's unauthor-
ized transfer of the securing property in the sense that the borrower is
thereby liable for damages for a breach; the borrower simply must re-
pay the entire loan in accordance with the explicit terms of the mort-
44. Thornburg, supra note 2, at 653-54. Note that the due-on-sale clause currently used in
the uniform mortgage instruments developed by Fannie Mae, known as paragraph 17, contains
the following language:
Lender shall have waived such option to accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer,
Lender and the person to whom the Property is to be sold or transferred reach agreement
in writing that the credit of such person is satisfactory to the Lender and that the interest
payable on the sums secured by this Deed of Trust shall be at such rate as Lender shall
request.
Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145 n.2 (1983)(emphasis added).
Paragraph 17 is used in many loan instruments. Id
45. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404(1) (1944).
46. Id § 404(3); see also Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163,
165, 250 N.W.2d 804, 805 (1977); Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine
to Real Propery Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REv. 747, 774 & n.l 14 (1973).
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gage contract. Consequently, the due-on-sale clause does not amount
to a direct restraint on alienation. 47
Some courts characterize the due-on-sale clause as an "indirect"
restraint.48 The California Supreme Court in Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America49 set out the "indirect" restraint argument: Assume a prospec-
tive purchaser of the property is willing to pay the asking price of the
seller, but only if he can assume that seller's existing mortgage. If the
lender refuses to permit the assumption, or conditions the assumption
on the purchaser's agreeing to an increased interest rate, the purchaser
may be unable to afford the property with the higher financing costs
unless the seller agrees to a lower sale price. If the seller is unwilling to
sell at a lower price, the entire transaction will fail. Thus, according to
this argument, the due-on-sale clause has the effect of rendering that
property inalienable, at least with respect to these specific parties.50
The argument that a due-on-sale clause is inherently a restraint on
alienation because its operation may eliminate a few property transac-
tions at the margin treads on treacherous ground, however. First, note
the assumptions about the borrower and seller that are required to
reach the restraint result. Both parties must be inflexible with regard to
the selling price; this characterization is, however, often unrealistic.
Few real estate transactions are consummated without any bargaining
over the ultimate sale price. Of course, if the difference between the
interest rate on the seller's existing mortgage and the market rate is
great, the amount by which the seller would be required to lower his
price might well discourage a sale. That disincentive is reduced as the
spread between the two rates decreases, a point that the Wellenkamp
analysis failed to consider.51 Indeed, the absence of an enforceable
47. See In re Foreclosure of Deed of Trust Executed by Bonder, 306 N.C. 451, 456, 293
S.E.2d 798, 801 (1982); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 813-15 (rex.
1982)(citing to Restatement); see also, Comment, supra note 17, at 444. Even one of the more
vehement critics of the clause conceded that "arguing that the due-on-sale clause is, under the
restraints doctrine, per se invalid is a futile gesture." Volkmer, supra note 46, at 804 n.*.
48. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 950-51, 582 P.2d 970, 973-74, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 383 (1978); Redd v. Western Say. & Loan Co., 646 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah 1982).
Other courts, in refusing to enforce due-on-sale clauses, have foregone any inquiry into what kind
of a restraint such clauses represent, simply taking the fact they they are restraints as given. See,
ag., Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61, 63 (Miss. 1975); see also Subcomm. Report, supra note 12, at
901.
49. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
50. Id at 951, 582 P.2d at 973-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384. A number of critics have embraced
this argument. See, e.g., Bonanno, supra note 11, at 284; Volkmer, supra note 46, at 748-49; Note,
supra note 24, at 285-86; Note, supra note 36, at 1112.
51. The court in Welenkamp discussed weighing the "quantum of restraint" of the clause
against its justifications in determining its reasonableness, but ultimately concluded that all due-
on-sale clauses require a "significant showing" of justification to be enforced, not simply those
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due-on-sale clause is like any other attribute of the property in that it
affects the property's value. A seller of property subject to a mortgage
with such a clause cannot offer prospective purchasers financing at be-
low-market rates. In that sense, the property is less valuable than an
identical property with advantageous financing. But the seller is hardly
in a position to protest, because he bargained for the less attractive as-
set, the mortgage subject to acceleration on sale. Presumably he paid
less to obtain a mortgage with such a clause, precisely because of the
decreased resale value.
Second, the assertion that a due-on-sale clause qualifies as an indi-
rect restraint is undermined by an examination of the effect that invali-
dation of such clauses has on other segments of the market for real
property. A loan with an unenforceable due-on-sale clause, in effect a
fixed-rate mortgage loan with an expected maturity of perhaps thirty
years, is a riskier asset for a lender than a loan with an expected matur-
ity of six or seven years.5 2 The risk is particularly acute for a lender
relying on short term liabilities for its funds. To compensate for this
increased risk, a lender must charge a higher interest rate on a fixed-
rate loan on which he cannot exercise his rights under a due-on-sale
clause.5 3 Consider then the prospective purchaser who wants to finance
the purchase of property that is not subject to an existing mortgage.
This purchaser must pay the prevailing rate on a mortgage loan, and
that rate will be higher than a lender would charge for a loan subject to
an enforceable due-on-sale clause. This buyer may be unable to afford
that particular property at the higher rate of interest, whereas he may
have been able to afford it at the lower rate, which would have been
available if the lender were able to enforce a due-on-sale clause. As a
result, invalidation of due-on-sale clauses operates as a restraint on
alienation of property just as does the enforcement of the clause. Thus,
it is incongruous to disregard an otherwise valid contract term in the
name of preserving alienation of property, when the effect of such dis-
regard is to restrain alienation of property somewhere else in the
market.
Even if a court characterizes the due-on-sale clause as a restraint,
it should not hold the clause unenforceable unless it is also unreasona-
clauses sought to be enforced where the interest spread exceeds a certain threshold amount. 21
Cal. 3d at 948-49, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83.
52. The average time between sales of residential real property in California, for example, is
seven years. Note, supra note 24, at 276.
53. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
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ble.54 Most courts determine the reasonableness of a restraint through
a balancing test, weighing the justifications for its use-in this case,
promotion of freedom of contract and equitable and efficient allocation
of risk-against its disadvantages. 5 According to Herbert Bernhard,
the practice of voiding restraints is designed to address five "evils": (1)
obstruction of commerce, (2) concentration of wealth, (3) survival of
the least fit, (4) abuse of creditors, and (5) dead hand control.56 En-
forcement of a due-on-sale clause does not implicate the second, third,
or fifth "evil" to any significant extent.5 7 Furthermore, enforcement of
a due-on-sale clause does not obstruct commerce in property to an ex-
tent greater than does invalidation of such a clause.58 Only the concern
for abuse of creditors remains. The fear is that individuals will repre-
sent that they are good credit risks because of their real property hold-
ings when, in fact, restraints on the alienation of their property may
substantially reduce its actual value.59 In the case of due-on-sale
clauses, however, invalidation works to the detriment of creditors.
Therefore, neither the concern for obstruction of commerce nor the
54. See Finch, supra note 24, at 309-11 (discussing the development of the reasonableness
test); see, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal.3d 943, 953, 582 P.2d 970, 976-77, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 385-86 (1978).
55. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal.3d 943, 948-49, 582 P.2d 970, 973, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 382 (1978); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 166, 250
N.W.2d 804, 806 (1977); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 158-59 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Malouffv. Midland Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 298, 509 P.2d 1240,
1243 (1973).
The balancing test results in a determination of the desirability of permitting lenders to avoid
portfolio risk through due-on-sale accelerations, because even those courts that have held that
protection from portfolio risk is not a reasonable justification have held that protection from spe-
cific risk is reasonable enough to warrant the restraint. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 166, 250 N.W.2d 804, 806 (1977).
It is interesting to note that the Illinois Supreme Court, finding that specific risk protection
was a reasonable justification for the restraint, ultimately declared that the due-on-sale clause was
per se reasonable. The court did so in the interest of avoiding uncertainty about a contract provi-
sion; such uncertainty, if found, could be resolved only through litigation. Baker v. Loves Park
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 126, 333 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1975).
56. Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on Alienation, 57 MICH. L.
Rav. 1173, 1180 (1957).
57. These evils arise principally in the case of a direct prohibition against alienation, which, it
was feared, would concentrate wealth in the hands of those who owned property of which they
could not dispose, would encourage the incompetent or unproductive management of property,
and would in effect allow a remote and often deceased grantor to exercise control over the prop-
erty. See Bernhard, supra note 56, at 1180. Because the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause does
not absolutely prevent the alienation of the property involved, it does not give rise to these
concerns.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
59. Bernhard, supra note 56, at 1180. In fact, Bernhard contends that this fourth "evil" is the
most compelling modern reason for invalidating restraints. Id at 1181.
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concern for abuse of creditors amounts to an important "evil" in deter-
mining whether due-on-sale clauses, if considered restraints on aliena-
tion, are reasonable.
Moreover, enforcement of the clauses is justified by the important
benefits of freedom of contract and optimal risk allocation. The due-
on-sale clause represents a useful contracting option in the mortgage
market, and the freedom of individuals to make contracts enjoys a gen-
erally favored position in American jurisprudence.60 The economic
justification for freedom of contract is that the legal enforcement of
contracts facilitates a system of voluntary exchange, which in turn per-
mits the efficient allocation of resources. 61 When persons seek to enter
into a contract that would have the effect of restricting another person's
freedom to contract sometime in the future, however, allocative effi-
ciency arguments for enforcing that contract dissipate; the positive ef-
fects of permitting the original contract will be offset by the negative
future effects of the restriction. A sales contract containing an absolute
prohibition against alienation of property poses an example. Any ben-
efit resulting from the initial transfer is offset by inefficiencies that will
result if the new owner values the property less than some subsequent
potential purchaser, but cannot transfer it. On the other hand, if the
restrictive contract is not enforced, the net effect to society cannot be
negative; the seller may refuse to sell, effecting no change in resource
allocation, or he may find a buyer willing to pay a higher price to com-
pensate him for not being able to restrict future alienation, in which
case the allocational benefits of free transfer are achieved.
Due-on-sale clauses should be denied enforcement and an excep-
tion to the freedom of contract rule should be tolerated, therefore, only
if invalidation has a positive effect on allocative efficiency. In fact, dis-
regard of a due-on-sale clause may result in a net societal loss. Al-
though the net effect on total alienability resulting from invalidation of
the clause is unclear and probably relatively small,62 certain borrowers
and lenders will be left less well off. Consider the borrower who does
60. See A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1376 (1952).
61. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11, 41-42 (1972). Posner cited the example
of individual A who owns a piece of property with which he believes he can earn an income
stream equal to a present value of $1000. Individual B believes that he can earn an income stream
equal to a present value of $1500 from that property. If A sells the property to B for $1250, both
will be better off and, assuming that their expectations are generally correct, the property will be
put to more efficient use by B. Id at 11.
62. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. It might be argued that the effect of void-
ing even strict restraints on alienation produces only a negligible net effect on alienability of prop-
erty, because a property owner might simply refuse to convey property if he cannot prevent the
grantee thereafter from reconveying it. Yet there is an inevitable limit to how long a given piece
of property can remain in one person's possession, and those taking after such a person's death
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not place much value on the ability freely to assign his mortgage, be-
cause, for example, he intends to retain the securing property for an
extended period of time. If a lender cannot offer this borrower a mort-
gage with an enforceable due-on-sale clause, the borrower is faced with
the choice of either purchasing a feature he does not want at the price
of a higher interest rate, or foregoing the transaction entirely, in which
case both lenders and sellers lose a prospective customer. If a lender
can offer a mortgage with a valid due-on-sale clause, all borrowers
would be able to make an optimal choice, because those who value an
assumption feature would still be free to bargain for it.63 With the net
effect on allocative efficiency unclear, the policy favoring freedom of
contract suggests that enforcement is reasonable.
Enforcement of a due-on-sale clause is also reasonable because it
provides the most equitable and efficient allocation of the risks that are
unavoidably associated with the lending of money. The due-on-sale
clause imposes the costs of that risk on the respective participants in the
mortgage lending market to the extent that their market preferences
entail a desire to assume such risk; whereas the prohibition of the use of
the due-on-sale clause effectively requires certain borrowers to give up
more risk than they would prefer at the given interest cost, while be-
stowing a windfall of reduced risk on a limited class of current
borrowers.
This analysis is best demonstrated by segregating the short-term
and long-term effects of invalidating the due-on-sale clause. In the
short term, lenders will suffer an immediate loss on the value of their
loan portfolios, and in the long term, borrowers will suffer a loss to the
extent that they can no longer fit the available mortgage products to
their risk preferences. A borrower already holding a mortgage benefits
immediately from a nullification of the clause because such a ruling
relieves him of any interest rate risk. The borrower is always able to
avoid the downside risk, because he is free to refinance his mortgage if
interest rates fall. Although prepayment penalties can undermine the
borrower's advantage,64 many states prohibit or severely limit such
penalties. 65 Even in a jurisdiction where prepayment penalties are un-
may well be more inclined to part with the property. Hence, the net effect ultimately is to promote
the alienability of property.
63. See HUD REPORT, supra note 26, at 17.
64. Note, supra note 36, at 1126.
65. For example, prepayment penalties are prohibited in Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47.20(5) (West Supp. 1984), and Maryland, MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-1009(e) (West
Supp. 1983), and they are restricted in Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 138.052(2)(a) (West Supp.
1983)(no penalty after five years, and otherwise limited to 60 days interest on that part of the
prepayment in excess of 20% of the amount of the loan), and in California, CAL. Bus. & PROF.
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restricted, however, the penalty would have to be quite high to offset
the savings that the borrower would realize from a refinancing if inter-
est rates drop significantly. 66 If a court renders the due-on-sale clause
unenforceable, the borrower enjoys the advantage of interest rate in-
creases because he can transfer his below-market-rate mortgage at a
premium.67 The borrower is thus in a no-lose situation when a court
refuses to enforce due-on-sale clauses in outstanding mortgages. In
contrast, enforcement of such clauses would allocate the risk associated
with interest rate uncertainty roughly equally between the borrower
and lender, as the parties anticipated at the time they struck their
bargain.6 8
Faced with the situation of losing regardless of movement in inter-
est rates, a lender will increase the interest rate it charges on its fixed-
rate loans, or stop making fixed-rate loans altogether.69 Assuming that
the mortgage lending industry is competitive, the previous rate will
have been sufficiently high to cover the lenders' costs, including return
on capital, to account for expected changes in the rate of inflation, and
to compensate for the level of specific and portfolio risk associated with
the borrower and the debt instrument. The invalidation of the due-on-
sale clause increases the portfolio risk associated with the fixed-rate
mortgage,70 and the lender will not be able to cover his total lending
costs unless he increases the interest rate on these loans.
CODE § 10242.6 (West 1984)(no penalty after seven years, and otherwise subject to the same limits
as in Wisconsin). This list is not exhaustive. Also, federally chartered savings and loan associa-
tions are prohibited from imposing prepayment penalties in conjunction with a due-on-sale clause
acceleration. Contract Provisions for Real Estate Loans, 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g)(2) (1983).
66. For example, assume borrower B takes out a $100,000, 20 year mortgage at 15%. Assume
also that all interest calculations will be performed on a simple, annual basis. B's monthly pay-
ment under that mortgage is $1331.35. Assume that after five years, market rates drop to 10%, and
B wants to refinance his loan. He will have paid $6582.14 of the principal, so he will have to
borrow $93,417.86 to repay the original lender. His monthly payment on the new mortgage, as-
suming a 10% rate and a 15-year term, will be $1023.50, $307.85 less than on the 15% mortgage.
That savings has a present value, at 10% annual interest, of $20,593.30.
67. See Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tenn. 1973).
68. Of course, it is not necessarily inequitable for the lender to shoulder all of the interest
risk, as long as it is being duly compensated for doing so. But, as is demonstrated, infra at text
accompanying notes 69-71, the lender would have charged a higher interest rate had it known the
due-on-sale clause would be unenforceable. Every borrower already indebted under a mortgage
containing a due-on-sale clause receives a benefit at the expense of the lender as an immediate
result of the court's decision to invalidate the clause, in the form of a valuable assumability option
for which the borrower paid nothing.
69. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3075; HUD REPORT, supra note 26, at 2; Note,
supra note 24, at 305.
70. The lender will not enjoy the benefits of holding a long-term fixed-rate asset during peri-
ods of falling rates, because borrowers will refinance at the lower rates. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 64-66. When allowed to exercise its rights under a due-on-sale clause, the lender can
update its portfolio during periods of rising rates. In this way the lender's portfolio return fluctu-
ates around the market rate, above the market rate until borrowers can refinance and below it
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The lender's only real concern with invalidation of due-on-sale
clauses is the short term loss associated with the mortgages it holds at
the time of invalidation because it can avoid future losses, once it
knows the clause is unenforceable, by increasing the rate on its fixed-
rate loans.71 The long term effect of invalidating due-on-sale clauses
involves a different sort of risk misallocation, however. Once the mort-
gage with a due-on-sale clause is no longer an option, all borrowers
must pay the interest premium for an assumable mortgage regardless of
their desire for the assumption feature. Therefore, although the bor-
rower otherwise would not opt to pay for the assumption feature, he
nonetheless must pay because he represents increased portfolio risk to
the lender. The borrower is less well off because the assumption fea-
ture is not worth the premium he must pay.72
The Gan Act has effectively remedied these microeconomic
problems with respect to prospective loans. The converse problems
may be aggravated, however, when the preemption becomes effective
with regard to window period loans. To the extent that lenders had
increased the interest rate on these loans, assuming that these mortgage
contracts continued to contain due-on-sale clauses, to compensate for
the increased portfolio risk, they will receive a benefit at the expense of
those borrowers whose loans will no longer be freely assumable.73 This
concern alone should not encourage states to extend the window period
moratorium, however, because that benefit will at most offset the loss
that those lenders suffered upon invalidation of the clause in the first
instance. In fact, if the states allow a moratorium of any length on the
federal preemption the lenders will not recoup all of their earlier
losses. 74
until properties are sold and the lender can raise the interest rate. Invalidation of the due-on-sale
clause inhibits the lender's ability to update its portfolio, by extending the expected interval be-
tween interest increases on any particular loan from 6 or 7 years to 25 or 30 years; the borrower's
ability to refinance is unimpaired, however. That represents the increased portfolio risk. See
HUD REPORT, supra note 26, at 12.
71. HUD REPORT, supra note 26, at 17.
72. See id at 23.
73. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
74. Assuming that the size of the average lender's portfolio has not changed significantly
from the beginning of the window period to the end, its loss on resale of mortgages made assuma-
ble by the state restriction would be offset by the premium it will receive on resale of loans made
unassumable by the Garn Act preemption. The lender stands to gain on the same percentage of
its post-window period portfolio that it was forced to sell at a loss from its pre-window period
portfolio. Any loans held through the window period will be restored to their original value. If a
lender sells a loan during a moratorium period, it will not receive a premium for the nonas-
sumability feature to offset an earlier loss, and its net position as a result of the restriction and the
preemption will be negative.
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In summary, the due-on-sale clause cannot properly be invali-
dated as unconscionable or as an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
To the contrary, it should contribute economic benefit to borrower and
lender alike, at least in the long run. Further, enforcement of the
clause is consistent with the general policy of freedom of contract.
Hence, the Gain Act represents a positive development in the law of
mortgages and states should not dilute its beneficial effects by ex-
tending the moratorium on preemption for window period loans.
III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE AND TRENDS
FOR THE FUTURE
Federally chartered savings and loan associations were exempt
from state restrictions on due-on-sale clauses even before the Gain Act,
by virtue of the FHLBB's regulation authorizing the use of the clause,75
and the subsequent decision by the Supreme Court in Fidelity Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta76 that the regulation pre-
empted state law. Furthermore, the Gain Act, and the final regulations
promulgated under the Act by the FHLBB, specifically exempt loans
originated by federal savings and loan associations from the window
period requirements. 77 As a result, due-on-sale clauses are enforceable
in federal savings and loan mortgage instruments, regardless of the
date the mortgage was executed.
Clauses in loans originated by national banks or federal credit un-
ions during the window period are subject to invalidation in those
states that imposed restrictions on due-on-sale clauses before the Garn
Act, until October 15, 1985.78 The moratorium may be altered, how-
ever, by appropriate rules promulgated before October 15, 1985 by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, in the case of national
banks, or by the National Credit Union Administration Board, in the
case of federal credit unions.79 The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency has issued final regulations shortening the moratorium on
preemption to April 15, 1984; after that time, the clauses are fully en-
75. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. For additional material on the effect of the
Garn Act preemption on federally chartered lenders, see generally Geier, Due-on-Sale Clauses
Under the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 17 U.S.F.L. REv. 1355 (1983).
76. 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1983); see also supra note 25.
77. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(2)(C) (1982); Preemption of State Due-on-Sale Laws, 48 Fed. Reg.
21,561, 21,562 (1983). Recall that the Act generally provides that loans originated or assumed
during the window period continue to be subject to pre-Garn Act state law until October 15, 1985.
See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
78. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982); Preemption of State Due-on-Sale Laws, 48 Fed. Reg.
21,561, 21,562 (1983).
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982).
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forceable on all loans subject to its regulations regardless of state law.80
Also, although national banks may not enforce due-on-sale clauses on
window period loans before that date, they are permitted to condition
assumption on the assumer's agreeing to an increase in the loan rate to
a blended rate, the average of the existing contract rate and the market
rate at assumption.8' Such restrictions apply only to residential real
property, however; due-on-sale clauses are enforceable on loans se-
cured by commercial property without restriction. 82 The final regula-
tions of the National Credit Union Administration Board shortened the
moratorium on preemption for window period loans to November 18,
1982.83
State banks and savings and loan associations must continue to
abide by pre-Gam Act state law concerning due-on-sale clauses for all
window period loans until October 15, 1985.84 In most states, there will
be no window period restriction because there was no state restriction
on the use of due-on-sale clauses. Lenders in those states may make
use of due-on-sale clauses subject to the narrow restrictions of the Gain
Act.8 5 Prior to the Gain Act, however, the enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses had been restricted by courts in six states, 86 and by legislatures
80. Real Estate Loans Made by National Banks, Validation and Enforcement of Due-on-
Sale Clauses, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,283, 51,286 (1983).
81. Id
82. Id
83. Regulation of Due-on-Sale for Window Period Loans, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,424, 54,428 (1982)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6).
84. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text for a description of the window period
exception.
85. See supra note 4.
86. Courts in the following states held prior to the Garn Act that a due-on-sale clause is
unenforceable unless the lender's security interest is jeopardized by the transfer:
Arizona: Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 79, 81, 486 P.2d 152, 154 (1971), cerl.
denied 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1322 (1972). Although this case did not have statewide applica-
tion, a later case with the same holding did. Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473,
478-79, 578 P.2d 152, 157-58 (1978). Nonetheless, in a post-Ham decision, the Arizona Supreme
Court held that Harn, decided on July 8, 1971, marked the beginning of the window period of
unenforceability in Arizona. Scappaticci v. Southwest Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 135 Ariz. 456, 461, 662
P.2d 131, 136 (1983).
Arkansas: Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 853, 481 S.W.2d 725, 728
(1972)(window period began June 19, 1972).
California: Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953, 582 P.2d 970, 975, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 385-86 (1978)(window period began Aug. 25, 1978).
Michigan: Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 166, 250
N.W.2d 804, 806 (1977)(window period began Jan. 5, 1977).
Mississippi: Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61, 64 (Miss. 1975)(window period began July 21,
1975).
Washington: Bellingham First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 441-42,
553 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1976)(window period began Aug. 19, 1976).
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in six other states,8 7 and those restrictions will apply for the duration of
the moratorium to all window period loans issued by state chartered
lenders.
The future of the due-on-sale clause under state law is less predict-
able than under federal law. So far, only one state, Arizona, has exer-
cised its power under the Garn Act to extend the duration of the
moratorium on the preemption of pre-Garn Act state law beyond the
three years provided in the Act.88 New Mexico, in contrast, has acted
to permit state lenders to increase the rate on window period loans by
as much as two percentage points, plus a one point assumption fee, in
order to offset any advantage which the Gan Act preemption might
have created for federal lenders.8 9 Recently, several states acted to
override the federal preemption of state usury restrictions pursuant to a
power similar to that provided by the Gain Act,90 giving perhaps some
indication of the states' willingness to extend the moratorium. The
states' desire to retain control over interest restrictions may prove to be
more intense, however, than the desire to restrict the enforcement of
due-on-sale clauses. The Iowa and Utah state legislatures had already
87. Enforcement of due-on-sale clauses has been restricted by statute to those instances
where the lender's security interest is jeopardized by the transfer in the following states:
Iowa: IOWA CODE § 535.8(2)(c) (Supp. 1982)(effective July 1, 1979).
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-7-11 to -13 (Supp. 1983)(effective Mar. 15, 1979), re-
pealed by N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-7-15 to -19 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-15-1 to -3 (Supp. 1983)(effective May 12, 1981). This statute
overrules Utah's common law approval of due-on-sale clauses, which was announced in a later
Utah Supreme Court case, Redd v. Western Say. & Loan Co., 646 P.2d 761, 767 (Utah 1982)(al-
though decided after the effective date of the statute, case arose before that date, and therefore
turned on application of prior law).
Three other states have statutes limiting the amount by which an interest rate can be raised
on any existing loan. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-60-165 (1982)(effective July 1, 1975)(permits an in-
crease of only one percent in the interest rate upon assumption); GA. CODE ANN. 44-14-5(b)
(1982)(effective July 1, 1979)(permits an increase of only one percent in the interest rate upon
assumption and only if the original borrower is released from liability); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47.20 (Supp. 1984)(effective June 1, 1979)(prohibits any interest rate increase on any loans made
before May 9, 1981). The Georgia and Minnesota statutes do not specifically preclude the en-
forcement of due-on-sale clauses, however, so a lender in one of these states might achieve its
purpose of updating the rates on its portfolio by actually accelerating the loan pursuant to the
clause, rather than conditioning assumption on a rate increase. Nonetheless, the Senate Report
includes these states in its list of window period states. SENATE REPORT, _upra note 4, at 3076 n.2.
It is not clear whether these states can invalidate the clauses outright with respect to window
period loans, but Congress did indicate a desire to limit the state's ability to increase the scope of
their existing restrictions. Id at 3077; see supra note 4.
88. The extension is to October 15, 1987. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1571 (Supp. 1983-84).
89. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-7-15 to -19 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
90. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
221, § 501, 94 Stat. 132, 161-63 (codified as a note to 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1982)). The only win-
dow period states that overrode that federal preemption are Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-13-
101 (Supp. 1983), and Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-20(l) (Supp. 1983).
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demonstrated their policy choice against the enforcement of due-on-
sale clauses prior to passage of the Gain Act.91 The Utah legislature
explicitly codified its findings; it considered the clause an unreasonable
restraint on alienation "to the detriment of the public welfare." 92
These states, therefore, seem to be the most likely to extend the morato-
rium on preemption. The ultimate status of the due-on-sale clause will
remain uncertain until the deadline for extending the moratorium has
passed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Gain Act, insofar as it removes restrictions on the enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clauses, benefits both lenders and borrowers. Re-
gardless of the historical purposes of the due-on-sale clause, use of the
clause became prevalent because it is a useful mechanism for allocating
risk between the participants in the mortgage industry. In fact, as Con-
gress recognized,93 enforcement of the clause is necessary to ensure the
continued availability of the fixed-rate mortgage, a popular instrument
from the borrower's perspective.
The states should refrain from exercising their power to extend the
moratorium on the Gan Act preemption. By extending the prohibi-
tion of the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses for window period loans,
a state might gain a little in terms of protection of borrowers' expecta-
tions, but it could lose significantly in terms of the decreased flow of
funds to its mortgage market.
Eric J Murdock
91. See supra note 87.
92. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-15-1 (Supp. 1983).
93. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3075.
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